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The Added Worker Effect:
A Reappraisal
ABSTRACT
In this pacer, the added worker effect is interpreted
as a response to uncertain returns to labour supply offers
by ce:rbers of a household. A model of household labour
supply is develboed in which each member's current labour
forcestatus affects thejob search and participation
decisionsofthe other and thus the probabilities of observed
transitions between the states of employment, unemployment,
and non—participation. The determinants of actual house-
hold transitions are then inestigated using continuous
employment histories for a sample of low—income famiUes.
Simulations using the estimatedtr3esit on functions show
that increased unemoloymentamongmarried men has a size—







"Afterthreedecades of research and occasionally animated
controversy, the short—run behavior of the labor force is still not
well understood."
Jacob Mincer [1966]
Cyclical fluctuations in the size of the labour force, and their effect
on measured unemployment, have been controversial topics since the Depres-
sion1. Theresponseof labour force participation rates to a transitory
increase in the unemployment rate is usually described in terms of two
components of opposite sign ——theadded worker effect and the discouraged
worker effect. The discouraged worker effect refers to a widespread
deterioration in expected wages or employment opportunities among potential
workers which leads them to drop out of the labour force or to refrain from
entering it. In families whose employed members lose their jobs, this may be
offset by the added worker effect, as secondary workers enter the labour force
in response to the reduction in family income.
Much of the attention in this area has been focused on the relative
importance of these two forces in determining movements in the size of the
total labour force as demand conditions change, but the concern of this paper
is with the added worker effect alone. The Impact of unemployment on the
distribution of family incomes, and on the demographic composition of the
labour force, depends crucially upon the responses of individual households to
unemployment among their members. The nature and magnitude of these short—run
adjustments in household labour supply have been the subject of some
disagreement in recent years.
A spell of unemployment experienced by the male head of household affects
the labour supply of the wife in two ways; the transitory reduction in
1household income and the increase in husband's non—market time both tend to
reduce the relative value of the wife's non—market time. Mincer [1962] argued
that such a transitory reduction in income due to spouse's unemployment has a
greater effect on the labour supply of married women does than a permanent
income loss and appealed to the permanent income theory of consumption for an
explanation. Cain [1966] presented evidence to the contrary and is supported
by Beckman and MaCurdy [1980], who find no supply response to transitory
income variations among married women and note that this is consistent with a
life—cycle theory of household labour supply.
In a life—cycle context, the wife's participation decision is equivalent
to deciding what proportion of her lifetime to spend working in the market.
This time is allocated over the lifetime according to the relative value of
home time in each period. The husband's unemployment causes a substitution of
market work from other periods to the present, but if the household is not
credit constrained, the wealth effect of a short spell of unemployment will be
negligible.
It is necessary to depart from this deterministic life-cycle framework
once we recognize that the labour force entry of secondary workers is a
response to disequilibrium it-ithehousehold's labour supply and that there are
uncertain returns to a labour supply offer. Conditional upon current income
and the nature of credit markets, the household's response will depend upon
stochastic elements affecting the duration of unemployment and future wages,
for both the principal earner and any potential labour force entrant. The
approach followed in this paper, therefore, is to present a unified treatment
of job search and participation decisions within a household labour supply
framework, with search activity serving as the link between the participation
decision and actual employment. Since the decision to eater the labour force
2can be distinguished from the decision to accept a job offer when offer
arrivals are subject to uncertainty, the appropriate focus for an empirical
investigation of the added worker effect in this case is on flows into and out
of employtent and unemployment by wives, rather than on labour force status
per Se.
A detailed investigation of actual labour force transitions reveals that
increased unemployment among husbands has a sizable short—run effect on both
unemployment rates and employment rates for married women. Aithough this
increase in labour supply takes a variety of forms, including a reduction in
the probability of leaving employment, the principal effect of husband's
unemployment is to increase the probability of labour force entry for the
wife. The fact that these strong results come from the analysis of low—income
households suggest that the role of a credit constraint in generating the
added worker effect may be an important one.
A two person model of household labour supply under uncertainty (based on
Burdett and Mortensen [1978]) is developed in Section II. The optimal
decision rules derived from this model are analogous to those implied by
individual job search theories and static models of household time allocation,
offering a basis for comparison with these approaches. Events such as the
loss of a job by one member change these decision rules, which in turn affect
the stochastic movement of the household between labour force states. Section
III presents a technique for estimating the determinants of household
transition rates from actual employment histories, and is followed by a
description of the data and empirical specification. Section V contains the
transition rate estimates for female household heads, and the final section
employs the entire household transition matrix to simulate the effects of
increased unemployment among husbands on the labour supply of wives.
3II. THE DEL: HOUSEHOLD LABDUR SUPPLY UNDER UNCERTAINTY
Burdett andMortensen present a dynamic labour supply model in which the
employment history of an individual is generated by a Markov process. In the
two—person case, the transition probabilities of individual household members
are interdependent, since the employment status of one member affects the
labour supply decisions and search strategy of the other. In this section, a
version of the model is presented in which non-participation is considered to
be a state functionally distinct from the state of unemployment. The
household time allocation problem is simplified by assuming that the amount of
time devoted to market work, if employed, and to search, if unemployed, are
fixed constants. The opportunity for time-substitution between household
members is thus limited to a choice between states. To provide a more
complete account of random forces operating on the household and, in
particular, those which influence movements in and out of the labour force,
the utility value of non-market time is permitted to vary in a stochastic
manner.
It will be shown that the optimal decision rules derived from the
householcFs joint utility maximization underuncertaintyare analogous to the
reservation wages arising from standard search and participation analyses.
A. Household Preferences and Time Allocation
A two—person household chooses a strategy in each period so as to
maximize the expected value of household utility, U(t), where
U(t) =_______ (u(t)t+ U(t + At))
The instantaneous utility flow associated with consumption during the short
interval [t,t + At) is assumed to be a strictly concave function
u(x,2) where x is household income and & is a vector l'2 such
4that is the fraction of the time period devoted to leisure by member
It is assumed in the sequel that income and leisure are complements in
household production, and that the leisure times of the two household members
are substitutes, such that an increase in Li reduces the marginal utility
of Future utility flows are discounted at the subjective rate p.
The strategy is denoted by (x,Z.,s), where s =(s1,s2)such that Si is the
fraction of the period devoted to search by member 1.At this point, we
restrict the possible values of Si to zero and some fixed amount s. The
residual fraction of the time period not spent in leisure or search, h =
1—Lsi, is interpreted as the time spent working and is restricted to
zero and some fixed h. Obviously, it must be true that hi + s '1.
Utility maximization is subject to the constraint x y + w1h1 + w2h2
where wi is the wage earned by member i when employed and y is non—labour
income. This constraint can be re—written in a "full income" sense as
x + ÷
w22.2+ w1s1 + w2s2y + w1 + w2
given the definition of hi.
B.The State Space and Transition Functions
At any date, the household occupies a participation state j, which is a
vector (j1,j2) representing the employment status of both members. If j =
thenperson i is employed, while Jj =Uimplies that person i is unemployed
and searching for a job, and ij =Nimplies that person i is not participating
in the labour force. Therefore, jJ =CE,U,N}for i =1,2.
We nowintroducea stochastic movement of the household from one state to
another over time, where Pjk(t) is the probability of a transition from state
j to state k during the interval [t,t +t). Of course, these probabilities
are influenced by the household's allocation of time to search and market
5work, and the household's choice of a strategy is affected by uncertainty
regarding future state occupancies. Assume that the transition function can
be written as
P.k(tIt) =Xikt+ O(t) ,j* k
where Aikis a constant and O(t)/t +0as t +0.This implies that
liintLt\_{hifik t ÷0jk'
' 0if j * k
so that the probability of making any transition in a sufficiently short time
interval is negligible.
In interpreting the parameters {A .,}, we follow the discussion in Burdett
and Mortensen. Suppose that the job offers received by worker I arrive
randomly in sequence according to a Poisson process with mean ct.s where s1 is
the fraction of any time period allocated to search activity and a1 is the
expected number of offers received per unit of search time by person 1.If
fi@i) is the probability that an offer is equal to w.c W where W is the set
of all possible wage rates, then the probability that member i will receive an
offer Wj during a short time interval [t,t +t) is asf1(w1)Lt + O(t).
This implies that, for a one—person household,
=as1[l— Fi(wi)]
where F1(w1) is the c.d.f. corresponding to fi(wj) and w is the minimal
acceptable wage. That is, the instantaneous transition rate from unemployment
to employment is equal to the arrival rate of acceptable job offers.
Similarly, the probability that I is separated, given employment, is
denoted 51tt + O(t). The probability that both members receive job offers,
or that of any other joint event, is negligible when tt is small.
6C.The Intertemporal Decision Problem
The household's optimal strategy can be derived using dynamic
programming. A full description of the problem is contained in Lundberg and
will not be repeated here, except to note a number of assumptions imposed to
make it tractable. In the infinite horizon case, the household's optimal
strategy is stationary, transition rates are constant over time, and it is
appropriate to characterize the household's employment history as a Markov
process. To allow for changes in asset holdings over time or a finite time
horizon would, on the other hand, result in time—dependent strategies and
transition rates.
If job search while employed is ruled out, the household's time alloca-
tion is uniquely determined by the state occupied or, conversely, the choice
of a strategy (x,L,s) is equivalent to a choice among feasible states. The
optimal allocation of time can be derived by comparing the expected utility
associated with occupying alternative states.
First, consider the value to the household of alternate allocations of
member l's time, given that member 2 is working. To represent this, we
introduce the function V ,whichis the sum of the current utility flow when
member 1 is in state j1, plus the expected utility gain attributable to the
current allocation of l's time, given that an optimal policy is followed
subsequent to any event.5
Let w(w2) be the solution to VE(w(w2),w2) =V(O,w2) (la)
and w(w2) be the solution to V(c4(w2),w2) =VN(O,w2) (ib)
Then member 1 will continue to work at a job paying w1 if and only if
* *
>w1(w2), where the minimalacceptablewage w1 can be interpreted as
max[wf(w2),4(w2)]. If member 1 is unemployed, the household will accept a
7job offer w1 if the value of member 1 working at that wage exceeds the value
associated with 1 continuing to search, or VE(w1,w2) > V1(O,w2). This implies
that a job offer w1 is acceptable only if w1 > wf(w2). 6
In deciding whether member 1 should participate in the labour market,
givenno job attachment, the household will compare VU(O,w2) and VN(O,w2).
This implies that 1 will participate as an unemployed job searcher if the cost
of search, in teris of the utility loss from foregone leisure, is less than
the expected return to search, which is the expected rate at which acceptable
offers arrive times the conditional expectation of household utility gain from
an acceptable offer.AlL equivalent participation condition, in viewof(1),
r
is w1(w2) > w1(w2).
By following a similar procedure for the case when member 2 is not
employed, and for 2's time allocation given the employment status and wage of
member 1, we can see that the household's optimal strategy in terms of market
work and search activity can be completely described by (w('),w()) for i =
1,2.The function w(. )representsthe wage—equivalent value to the household
of unemployed search by member 1, and is analogous to the reservation wage in
individual job search models. The wage—equivalent value of non—participation
by member i, 4(.), issimilar to the "reservation wage" in a static
participation analysis (and would, in fact, be equivalent were job durations
not uncertain). The decision rules relating to the time allocation of each
member are interdependent and, when combined with offer arrival and separation
rates, can be used to describe household transition rates between labour
market states.
_______3w 3wf Proposition 1: -—>-—>0
This proposition, which is proved elsewhere, states that an increase in
the wage of an employed member of the household makes the other member less
8likely to participate in the labour force and, if they do participate, less
likely to accept a job offer. This leads directly to the result that member 1
is more likely to search for work and to accept a given wage offer if member 2
is unemployed, rather than employed at any acceptable wage, and provides a
rationale for the "added worker effect" under conditions of uncertainty.7
D. Stochastic Value of Non—Market Time
The model outlined above is capable of capturing a variety of
interactions between the labour supply and search behavior of household
members, and clearly demonstrates the source of an added worker type of
response to unemployment in the household. Transitions in and out of the
labour force, however, will occur only as an immediate result of a change in
the other member's employment status. We could expand this range of
possibilities by allowing the job searcher to acquire information about the
wage distribution while unemployed, or introduce some other type of time—
dependence thouseholdstrategies. An alternative approach is to consider a
wider variety of random events which may be experienced, and to some degree
anticipated, by the household.
A simple way to allow a stochastic value of non—market time in the
current model is to introduce individual—specific parameters b which affect
the productivity of leisure time, so the current utility flow is now
u(x,b11,b2i2). Suppose that each b1 is the current value of a random
variable, which changes over time in a manner analogous to the arrival of job
offers. Thus the waiting time between changes in b1 has a negative
exponential distribution with mean l/. For each member of the household the
value of b is selected at random from a known distribution with a cumulative
distribution function Gi(bj) such that the density gi(bi) represents the
9probability that the new value is equal tob1.
These random changes in the productivity of non—market time are intended
to reflect a variety of uncertain events. Of these, the most obvious may be
changes in the individual's health status. Other possibilities include
alterations in family composition 8uch as deaths or the departure of older
children, unexpected pregnancies, changes in the availability of child care,
or even the weather, to the extent that it affects the value of non—market
pursuits.
It is now clear that the household decision rules represented by







If member 2's leisure is relatively more productive in household
production, then member 1 will be more likely to participate, and will have a
lower reservation wage. This result also holds if member 2 is assumedto be
employed throughout or, even more strongly, if the increase in
raises w enough to induce member 2 to drop out of the labour force.
The effect of events which change the value of household non—market time
in general can be analyzed by assuming b1 =b2
=b.In this case, the impact
of a change in b on w and s4 is ambiguous, even if the employment status of
member 2 is held constant. An increase in b is more likely to have a positive
effect on w and w if member 2 is working, compared to when member 2 is
unemployed or not participating. We might expect, therefore, to find that the
usually—discouraging effects of children, age, and poor health on the labour
force participation of married women are less pronounced when the husband is
unemployed.
10We can now express the transition rates of a household among labour force
states in terms of the arrival rates of random events and the jointly
determined decision rules of household members. The next section discusses a
methodology for estimating these transition rates which is compatible with the
stochastic properties of the development above.
III. ESTThIATING LABOUR FORCE TRANSITION RATES
Inthe previous section, the instantaneous transition rates of a
household over labour market states, {Xjk} were derived as functions of the
arrival rates of random events and the household's strategy. The arrivals of
job offers and changes in the value of non—market time were assumed to be
Poisson, while the household's strategy (Wr wL) was asserted to be stationary,
i' i
giventhe restrictions placed on the model. These assumptions resultin
transitionrates which are time—independent and can be simply estimated if the
date of each transition is known.9
The advantages of applying maximum likelihood methods to continuous—time
models for the analysis of event histories have been pointed out in several
recent works.lO The alternatives, including a cross—sectional analysis of
state—occupancies using probit or logit and a regression analysis of
durations, all have serious shortcomings which will not be reiterated in
detailhere. A few aspects of the continuous time method, however, are
particularly relevant to the problem at hand.
1.Estimating the transition rates, themselves, rather than state
occupancy probabilities, permits the different types of household response to
unemployment to be treated separately. Th,e added worker effect can appear in
various manifestations, including an increased rate of labour force entry
11(given g1() and the arrival rate of shocks to the value of leisure), a
reduced rate of labour force exit from either employment or unemployment, and
an increased rate of job acceptance from unemployment.
2. The average length of a spell of unemployment is short relative to
the periods over which labour supply measures are aggregated in most cross—
sectional or panel methods. A transitory labour supply response to a short—
run change in the household's circumstances is therefore not likely to be
observed. A continuous—time technique, on the other hand, is capable of
examining the process of adjustment to a temporary event.
3.As Tuma and Robins have noted, a binary logit model is the
appropriate representation of the equilibrium state distribution resulting
from a two—state transition process with exponentially—distributed
durations. This result, however, does not generalize to more than two states,
so there is no obvious cross—sectional counterpart to a household transition
model.
For constant transition rates, state occupancy durations have a negative
exponential distribution which depends upon the Xjk In particular, the
cumulative distribution function representing the probability of a transition





where A = A
•kor the rate of leaving state j.
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(3) j 1 0 dt
12Given that a transition does occur from state j, the conditional probability
that the destination is state k is X.kA., so that the probability of a spell




Wecan now construct a likelihood function for any sequence of state
occupancies by a sample of households, including both completed and
uncompleted spells, and form maximum likelihood estimates of the transition
rates.
As an example, consider a household which begins at time t0 in the state
(E,N), so member 1. is employed and member 2 is a non—participant. At time t1,
this household is observed to make a transition to (U,U). It then returns to
(E,N) at time t2andremains there until the end of the observation period,
T. The contribution of this household to the likelihood function, then, is
—(t2—t1)A [e [e .X]
.[e
whereX = E A EN ENk.
We do not, of course, wish to assume that transition rates are identical
for households, but rather examine their dependence upon observable





where is a vector of parameters to be estimated for each transition rate
and X(i) are observable explanatory variables for household i which may be
13state—dependent.
The above specification has some very convenient properties. The log of
the likelihood function is separable in the individual transition rates, so
that each parameter vector, @ ,canbe estimated independently. In addition,
jk
each spell in state j can be easily divided into sub-spells to allow the
values of exogenous variables to vary. These same properties, of course, are
sources of the major limitations of this method. The assumed time—
independence of the rules out any duration dependence in the rate of
leaving a state.1]. Parameterizing theAjk as exact functions of household
characteristics which is not necessary, but sufficient, for the separability
of the likelihood function does not permit the isolation of unobserved
individual effects, and thus fails to take advantage of one of the major
opportunities presented by longitudinal data. Such a formulation may also
lead to biased coefficients if such unobserved heterogeneity is important.l2
Both of these shortcomings can be readily overcome by a more complicated
model. For analyzing the movements of a large sample over a number of
employment states, however, the simple exponential model offers obvious
computational advantages while maintaining a close correspondence with the
theoretical framework.
IV. DATA AND ESTIMATION
Household transition rates were estimated using longitudinal data from a
sub-sample of two—head families from the Seattle and Denver Income Maintenance
Experiments (SIME/DIME). These experiments were the largest of several
federally—funded programs designed to test the effects of a negative income
tax (NIT) on labour supply. About 4,800 families were initially enrolled in
the experiment; data are available for 2,038 families in Seattle and 2,657
14families in Denver. These families did not constitute a random sample from
the populations of the two cities, but were chosen both to facilitate the
analysis of labour supply response, and to correspond as closely as possible
to thetarget population of a future, hypothetical NIT program. Four groups
weretherefore excluded from the sample:
1. Families with heads over 58 years of age or under 18 years of age.
2. Families with disabled heads who were unable to work.
3.Families with pre—experiment earnings in excess of $9,000 for a family of
four with one working head, or above $11,000 for a family offourwith two
workingheads.
4. Individuals who did not belong to a "family," defined as a unitconsisting
of either a married couple, or a single parent with a dependent child,
plus other relatives permanently residing with this unit.
Race and family structure, plus pre—experiment earnings adjusted for
family size, were used to assign families in a non-random fashion among eleven
different financial treatments, and a financial control group containing 40%
of the total sample.
The sample actuallyused in the estimation of household transition rates
consistsof 1 ,388 families living in Denver and 993 in Seattle. All were
required to satisfy the following criteria:
1. The family contains two heads ——i.e.,consists of a married or cohabiting
couple plus dependents.
2. The family was one of those originally enrolled in the experiment. This
excludes families formed during the course of the experiment, and
guarantees that a full year of pre-experiment data is available for each.
3. The family remains in the sample until the second periodic interview has
beenadministered, or approximately 6 to 8 months after enrollment.
15Earlier attrition, due to the structure of the periodics, results in
considerable missing data, including the absence of education and real
property information.
Some aggregate evidence of the added worker effect can be found in Table
1, where the unemployment of the male head is seen to be associated with a




Unemployment and Labour Force Participation Rates
forFemale Heads by Employment Status of Male Head
(DThIE sub—sample —1972annual averages)
Male Head
Employed Unemployed OutofLabour Force
White
Unemploymentrate 7.7 26.5 17.3
Participation rate 41.5 50.0 42.6
Black
Unemployment rate 9.2 31.1 22.8
Participation rate 51.0 52.5 47.2
Mexican—American
Unemployment rate 8.5 22.9 ——
Participationrate 26.1 19.2 9.9
I have shown elsewhere that household strategies, and therefore household
transition rates, should be affected by the flow of non—labour income
received, and by the parameters of the wage offer distribution facing
unemployed members. Use of the SIME/DD{E sample in estimating these effects
presents some difficulties, since the operational equivalents of these
concepts are not straight—forward. Individual households are faced with a
variety of support levels, tax rates, and other financial parameters which
16result in very complicated non—linear budget constraints. Even if the wage
offer distribution appears in the transition equation to be estimated only as
a single value representing the conditional expectation of an accepted wage,
it is still the net predicted wage we are interested in and no family faces a
constant marginal tax rate over all levels of family labour supply.
Rather than attempting to control for these effects by including
SIME/DIME treatment parameters in the form of dummy variables, the estimates
in the next section represent the family's opportunities in the form of a
current income flow and an estimated hourly tax on predicted earnings. The
tax is disaggregated into one component associated with the SIME/DIME program
and another due to other tax and transfer programs, and is calculated by
comparing current net income with a predicted level of net income resulting
from a change in the household's employment status. This procedure requires
not only a predicted wage for the unemployed, but also predicted hours of
work, which is proxied by mean hours of work over the employed sample (by year
and sex). The fixed hours assumption avoids the complete specification of the
non—linear budget constraint in the actual estimation of transition rates,
though of course it is required to construct the hourly tax rates.
Predicted gross wage rates are derived from regressions on average annual
wage observations for the entire sample of controls, run separately by race
and sex. Other current income includes monthly receipts from all sources —
earningsof family members other than the two heads, AFDC and other government
transfer payments, SIME/DIME payments, alimony, and asset income. All dollar
amounts are deflated using Seattle and Denver Metropolitan Price Indices and
are reported in July 1972 dollars. Age and number of children under six years
of age are included in the transition rate equations to represent the relative
value of non—market time.
17The log of the likelihood function described in Section III was maximized
with respect to the parameters of each transition rate separately using a
Newton—Raphson technique. Since the function is globally concave, any maximum
must be unique. The values of the independent variables are held constant at
their initial values for the duration of each household employment spell, but
allowing them to vary freely each month does not seem to alter the results
significantly.
V. PIRICAL RESULTS: TRANSITION RATE ESTIMATES
This section presents maximum likelihood estimates of the transition
rates specified in Section III. The determinants of transitions between the
three labour market states —employment,unemployment, and non—participation —
arediscussed for female household heads, with emphasis on the effects of
intra—household interactions. The section concludes with a summaryofthe
major results.
A. Labour Force Entry
Column 1 in Table 2 contains the estimated coefficients of the transition
rate from non—participation directly into employment (N*E) for all female
heads who were non—participants during the sample period (male heads may be
employed, unemployed, or out of the labour force). One of the most striking
aspects of this equation is the effect of the male head's employment status.
If the male head is employed, the female head is less likely to make a
transition from non—participation to employment, and the effect is highly
significant. In fact, controlling for other observable characteristics, the
transition rate of women whose husbands were unemployed or not in the labour
force is some 1.4 times the transition rate of those with employed husbands.14
18The hourly wage rate of the male head (predicted or actual, depending on
employment status), does not have a significant effect on the rate at which
the female head enters employment from outside the labour force. The
predicted wage of the female head herself serves as a proxy for the mean of
the wage offer distribution and was expected to have a positive effect on
probabilities of moving into the labour force and into employment. This
expectation is strongly confirmed in this case and in most of those which
follow. Age and the number of children under six years of age have a negative
effect on the NE transition, presumably because both variables are positively
related to the value of non—market time.
The dummy variables for race and ethnic origin are significant
determinants of this transition rate, and of many others. The magnitude and
direction of the effects vary considerably across experimental sites and
according to employment status of spouse, and in another context it would be
interesting to attempt an interpretation of these results. This will not,
however, be undertaken here, nor will a detailed examination of income and tax
effect.
Columns 2 and 3 in Table 2 present estimates of the NE transition rate
with the sample split according to employment status of the male heaad. In
general, the number of observations on households with male heads who were
non—participants was too small to estimate female head transition rates, so
these cases are excluded. A comparison of the two disaggregated models with
that estimated on the entire sample reveals some interesting patterns. In
particular, the number of children under six has a negative influence on the
N*E transitions of female heads only if the male head is employed. As was
shown above, this pattern of influence among factors increasing the value of
non—market time is a likely result of the household utility model. A
19comparison of age effects across equations also supports this contention.15
The estimated coefficients of the transition rate into unemployment for
non—participating female heads are not reported here, but can be briefly
summarized. Employment of the male head does not have a significant effect on
this transition rate. However, this apparent absence of a household effect on
the N+U transition rate reflects the behavior of the Seattle subsample only.
If this model is estimated on the Denver subsample only, the coefficient on
the dummy variable representing spouse's employment status is negative, as
expected, and significant at a 90 percent level. Age and children under six
once again have a discouraging effect on labour force participation.
B. The Outcome of Unemployment Spells
The most surprising results contained in Table 3 are that employment of
the male head increases the rate at which unemployed female heads accept jobs
by nearly 50 percent, and that this positive effect is reinforced by a higher
wage. Given the analysis of Section II, we had expected that employment of
the male head would increase the reservation wage of the female head, thus
making job acceptance less likely. An increase in the male head's wage, if
working, or predicted wage, if unemployed, should have a similar effect.
There are two possible explanations for these anomalous results. First,
an employed husband may be able to assist his wife's job search by providing
contacts or simply information, thus making her search time more productive.
The second possibility is that unobserved individual characteristics which
affect wage offer distributions and/or search productivities are positively
correlated within households. It may be possible in the future, by making
explicit use of repeated unemployment spells over the sample period, to separate the
effects of spouse's employment status from such marital matching effects.

















































Outof Labour Force +EmploymentTransition Rate for Female Heads
(ML estimates of effects on of the transition rate)*












tax and transfer programs ($)
Othercurrent income ($/100)
Age in years/1O





































1817The predicted wage of the female head has a positive effect on the
probability of entering employment, though the own—wage elasticity of this
transition rate is lower than that of the U*E rate. Other income discourages
job acceptance, as expected, and so do children under six. Age, however, does
not affect the entry rate into employment, conditional upon the participation
decision. Columns 2 and 3 reveal a familiar pattern in the coefficients on
age and children; they are significantly negative only when the male head is
employed.
The effect of spouse's employment status on the rate at which unemployed
female heads drop out of the labour force (UN) has the right sign, but falls
short of significance at the 90% level (results not reported). In fact,very
few of the independent variables appear to contribute individually to an
explanation of the dropout rate, though the x2statisticconfirms the
explanatory power of the model as a whole. The own—wage effect is significant
and negative, other income has a significant positive coefficient, and Seattle
residence discourages a U*N transition.
It is clear that these models are more successful in explaining
transitions into employment than transitions between unemployment and non-
participation. Part of this can probably be traced to the measurement errors
in timing the U+N and N+U transitions which resulted from the data
collection procedures. Another part of the problem may be that the random
events we expect to affect the relative values of non—market time and search
activity, such as illness and changes in family size, are not well represented
by the available independent variables. The issue arises, however, of whether
any meaningful distinction can be made between the states of non—participation
and unemployment. In this context, the continuing importance of own predicted
wage in the U*N model provides a reassuring indication of economic content.
22TABLE 3
Unemployment ÷ Employment Transition Rate for Female Heads
(ML estimates of effects on the logarithm of the transition rate)*
Total Male Head Male Head
Sample Employed Unemployed
Constant —2.21 —1.51 —2.77
(—10.45) (—6.16) (—4.27)
1 =Malehead employed 0.34
(3.35)
Actual or predicted 0.03 0.02 —0.08
hourly wage —malehead (2.21) (1.56) (—0.62)
Predicted 0.32 0.29 0.47
hourly wage —femalehead (4.85) C4.06) (2.56)
Hourly tax —SIME/DIME ($) 0.02 —0.30 —0.29
(0.18) (—1.67) C—1.26)
Hourly tax —othertax and —0.06 —0.05 —0.39
transfer programs ($) (— 0.76) (—0.59) (—2.30)
Other current income ($1100) —0.06 —0.01 0.12
(—1.72) (—0.36) C1.46)
Age in years/10 —0.06 —0.17 0.10
(—1.27) (—2.96) (0.92)
Number of children under 6 years —0.14 —0.15 —0.22
(—3.05) (—2.91) (—1.46)
1 =Black —0.31 —0.28 —0.32
C—3.67) (—2.89) (—1.40)
1 =Mexican—American —0.29 —0.27 —1.14
(—2.19) (—1.90) (—1.82)
1 =Seattle —0.64 0.64 —0.47
(—7.45) (—6.31) (—1.83)
131.82 75.78 19.08
Number of spells 1263 1102 376
Number of transitions 676 519 90
*(asymptotic t—statistics are in parentheses)
23An examination of transitions out of the two states should also provide a
basis for disaggregation on behavioral grounds. A combined estimate of the
U+E and N*E transition rates with all coefficients constrained to be equal
permits a likelihood ratio test of whether a disaggregation of the initial
states gives a significantly better explanation of transitions into
employment. This test was performed on observations from the last three years
of the Denver subsample, and strongly rejected the hypothesis that all
coefficients are equal.
C. Leaving Employment
In the total sample results presented in column 1 of Table 4, the
employment status of the male head and his hourly wage have no significant
effect on the transition rate from employment to unemployment (E+U) for female
heads. Age and number of children decrease the E+U rate, so the increasing
relative value of home time which these variables represent seems to be
outweighed by influences such as tenure and experience effects on job
separations, and the effect of children on the marginal utility of income to
the household.
Boththe employment of the male head and the wage of the male head when
employed have positive effects ontherate at which female heads leave the
labourforce from employment (E÷N). These influences, together with the
positive coefficient on the number of children under six years, suggest that
these E÷N transitions are a response to some change in the relative value of
non—market time. A comparison of these results with those in Table 4 provides
some justification for disaggregating flows out of employment in this manner,
though a formal test of the non—equivalence of unemployment and non-
participation in this context has not been undertaken)6
24D. Summary of the Transition Rate Estimates
In general, the results presented above offer considerable support for
the hypothesis that individual labour force transitions depend upon the
employment status and wage of other household members. The estimates of these
household effects are not, however, uniformly consistent with those predicted
by the theory. Where an anomalous result appears to be caused by some
deficiency in either the data or the empirical specification, this has been
noted in the preceding discussion with a view towards implementing more
effective tests in the future. It is clear, however, that household
influences are not equally important in the determination of all labour force
transitions, and some interesting patterns emerge.
1) In particular, the labour force participation decisions of female
heads appear to be strongly influenced by spouse's employment status. This is
most evident in the case of transitions between employment and non-
participation.
2) Transitions between non—participation and unemployment are rather
poorly explained by this model, and household variables in particular rarely
make a significant contribution. This may be the result of imprecision in the
timing of recorded transitions, or of the often—discussed weakness of the
behavioral distinction between the two states.
3) The importance of unobserved personal characteristics which affect
the efficiency or Intensity of job search activities is apparent from the
unemployment—employment transition results. The question naturally arises of
why the unexpected household effects which appear here do not appear in
the N+Eestimatesas well.
25TABLE 4
EmploymentUnemploymentTransition Rate for Female Heads
(MLestimates of effects on the logarithm of the transition rate)*
Total Male Head Male Head
Sample Employed Unemployed
Constant —2.73 —2.68 —2.84
(—6.50) C— 9.21) (—4.59)
1 =Nalehead employed 0.14
C 0.89)
Actual or predicted 0.02 0.02 0.13
hourly wage —malehead C 0.78) ( 0.66) ( 1.92)
Actual 0.02 0.18 —0.12
hourly wage —femalehead ( 0.21) ( 1.65) (—0.48)
Hourly tax —SIME/DIMECs) 0.07 —0.12 —0.42
( 0.56) (—2.48) C— 1.68)
Hourly tax —other —1.45 —1.67 —0.96
tax and transfer programs ($) C— 3.93) (—5.14) C— 0.65)
Other current income ($1100) 0.03 0.03 0.06
( 1.88) ( 1.18) ( 2.93)
Age in years/b —0.35 —0.39 —0.21
(—5.98) (—5.38) C— 1.68)
Number of children under 6 years -0.17 —0.13 —0.31
C— 2.78) (—1.97) (—1.70)
1 =Black 0.10 0.22 —0.43
C 0.99) ( 1.92) (—1.73)
1 =Mexican—American —0.26 —0.17 —2.06
C— 1.52) (—0.91) (—1.99)
1 =Seattle 0.15 0.02 0.35
( 1.36) C 0.16) ( 1.24)
98.40 67.60 29.14
Numberofspells 3116 3095 923
Number of transitions 473 353 69
*(asyptotic t—statistics are in parentheses)
26*(asymptotjc t—statistics are in parentheses)
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TABLE 5
Employment +OutofLabour Force Transition Rate for Female Heads
(MLestimates of effects onthe logarithm of the transition rate)*
Total Male Head Male Head
Sample Employed Unemployed
Constant —1.73 — 1.47 — 1.24
(—10.56) (—9.23) C— 2.32)
1 =Malehead employed 0.38
(4.07)
Actual or predicted 0.04 0.05 0.03
hourly wage — male head ( 3.51) ( 5.40) ( 0.24)
Actual hourly wage — — 0.01 0.20 — 0.57
female head (—0.15) ( 3.91) (—2.76)
Hourly tax —SIME/DIMECs) — 0.17 — 0.16 0.08
(— 11.33) (— 12.14) C 0.43)
Hourly tax — other











































2 454.54 477.16 43.02
Number of spells 3116 3095 923
Number of transitions 1584 1223 105The observance of a direct transition from non—participation to employ—
nient may be regarded as evidence of a spell of unemployment which was too
brief to be recorded. The fact that household income and time substitution
effects are observed to affect N'E transition but not U+E transitions y
then indicate some duration dependence in the response of an individual's
search strategy to changes in household conditions.
4) The effect of other variables are interesting in their own right and
many results, such as the consistency of own—wage effects even in the context
of U+N and NU transitions, have been noted above. More important for the
purposes of this study, however, is the confirmation of the theory's
predictions regarding interactions between spouse's employment status and the
value of home time provided by the pattern of coefficients on age and number
of children under six years.
VI. EMPIRICAL RESULTS: EMPLOYMENT STATE DISTRIBUTIONS
The transition rate estimates in the previous section give a detailed
picture of how the employment status of husbands and other variables affect
the labour market experience of married women. We would like, however, to
have a summary measure of the impact of spouse's unemployment on the
distribution of wives over labour market states ——i.e.on their unemployment
and participation rates. To this end, note that the transition rates define a
continous time stochastic process for which we should be able to find a
steady—state probability distribution.
Following Howard, we define P(t) as the probability that a continous
time Markov process occupies state j at time t and let (t) be the row
vector of state probabilities for all states. Let A be the square matrix
such that the j_kth off—diagonal element is the transition rate and the
28jth diagonal element is —A..
Then,
(t)
where eAt =I+At +A2t2 +A3t3 +
2! 3!
Differentiating this expression produces,
='(t)A




In this section, we concentrate on the equilibrium state distribution of
financial controls in the Denver sample only. The mean values of independent
variables are calculated for black and white subgroups of this population17,
and the coefficient estimates presented in columns 2 and 3 of each table in
the last section are used to produce average transition rates by race and by
employment status of the male head.
The simplest procedure is to calculate the equilibrium state distribution
of female heads as individuals, conditional upon the employment status of male
heads —i.e.,ignore the transitions of male heads. There is, however, a
major problem with this technique. Since the female heads reach an
equilibrium state distribution conditional upon the state of their spouses, it
is implicitly assumed that unemployed men remain unemployed forever. Since
the mean duration of an unemployment spell in this sample is just over two
months, transitions by both household heads must be permitted.
For this purpose, it is necessary to estimate transition functions for
the entire, nine—by—nine household transition matrix. Many of the estimates
for transitions of the male heads are presented in Lundberg, but for cells
where the number of observed transitions was very small, a population average
rate has been substituted.
29In Table 6, the steady—state unemployment rates and participation rates
of female heads by the employment status of spouse can be compared with
previous estimates and actual 1972 averages. Reassuringly, the estimated
household matrix generates a reasonable steady—state distribution.
Controlling for factors such as expected wage, other income, age, and number
of children, the equilibriun unemployment and participation rates of women
with unemployed husbands are higher than these rates for women ith employed
husbands. This relationship holds for both black and white subsamples and is
generated by higher rates of labour force entryandlower rates of labour
force exit for "added workers".
A better way to assess the magnitude of the added worker effect nay be to
observe the effect of an increase in the unemployment of married men on the
labour supply of their wives. This can be simulated by introducing a distur—
bance to a sample of households which are in labour market equilibrium. The
adjustment of the system back to its steady—state distribution can be traced
over time using interval transition probabilities.
Leaving the transition rate matrix unchanged, the initial state
distribution was altered so that the unemployment rate for male heads was
twice its equilibriin level. The monthly changes in the state distribution of
the households are presented in Table 7.
The initial effects of a doubling in the unemployment rate of male heads
can be summarized as follows. If 100 white husbands became unemployed
simultaneously, 36 additional wives will have entered the labour force by the
end of the first month. Of this 36, about 29 wives will have become
employed. If 100 black husbands become unemployed, 25 wives will join the
labour force and, of these, 20 will be employed by the end of the month.
Unemployment rates return very rapidly to their equilibrium levels, so the
30Table 6
Unemployment and Participation Rates for
FemaleHeads by Race and Employment






—malehead employed 6.2 7.9
—malehead unemployed 12.8 14.0
Participation rate
—malehead employed 43.7 37.0
—malehead unemployed 59.7 75.1
Black
Unemployment rate
—malehead employed 6.3 11.0
—malehead unemployed 14.6 1.3.2
Participation rate
—malehead employed 50.9 54.2
—malehead unemployed 65.8 81.7
system is stable. The participation rates of wives, however, are still 1.5 to
2% above their steady—state levels at the end of one year, indicating some
persistence in the employment effect.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In recent years, the high unemployment rates and volatile participation
behavior of groups in the labour force which are often considered to be
"secondary workers", such as women and teenagers, have received considerable
attention. The apparent importance of family structure in explaining changes
in the labour force status of these workers emphasizes the need to consider
job search behavior in a household labour supply context, and to expand the
31Table 7
Unemployment and Participation Rates by Month
Following A Doubling of the Male Head
Unemployment Rate in Month 0.
WHITE BLACK
End Unemployment Participation Unemployment Participation
of Rates Rate Rates Rate
Month AH FH FH MH FH FH
1 9.6 9.0 42.4 15.9 11.5 58.8
2 8.4 8.9 42.3 14.2 11.4 58.6
3 7.6 8.9 42.2 12.9 11.4 58.4
4 7.0 8.8 42.0 12.0 11.4 58.3
5 6.7 8.8 41.9 11.3 11.3 58.1
6 6.4 8.7 41.8 10.8 11.3 58.0
7 6.2 8.6 41.6 10.4 11.3 57.8
8 6.1 8.6 41.5 10.1 11.2 57.7
9 6.0 8.6 41.4 9.9 11.2 57.6
10 5.9 8.5 41.4 9.7 11.2 57.5
11 5.9 8.5 41.3 9.6 11.2 57.4
12 5.9 8.5 41.2 9.5 11.2 57.4
Steady— 5.7 8.4 40.5 9.1 11.2 56.6
State
traditional two—state labour market of job search theory to allow movements
into and out of the labour force.
This paper brings together the joint utility maximization of static
household models and the stochastic events which affect labour supply
opportunities in search theory, and applies a more comprehensive model to a
32study of the added worker effect. The theory suggests a continuous—time
exponential model of state—occupancy durations, with th& transition rates
depending upon both household strategies and the arrival rates of random
events (job offers, job separations, and changes in the value of non—market
time).
These transition rates are then expressed as functions of individual and
household characteristics, and the parameters of the model are estimated using
maximum likelihood methods on the employment histories of a sample of
households enrolled in the Seattle and Denver Income Maintenance
Experiments. The dependence of individual and household transition rates on
the employment status and wages of both household heads is then tested.
Cross—wage effects are found to be negligible, but the influence of
spouse's employment status on the observed transition rates of female
household heads is generally consistent with the theory. This effect is
particularly strong on transitions into and out of the labour force.
In the final section, the steady state unemployment and participation
rates of women with unemployed husbands are shown to be markedly higher than
the rates of women whose husbands are employed for both blacks and whites in
the DIME sample. A simulation of the effects of increasing the unemployment
rate of married men produces an additional response in the form of increased
participation and employment among their wives in the short—run.
33FOOTNOTE S
1.See the references in MIncer [1966] and Wachter.
2. As noted by Burdett and Mortensen, strict concavity can also be
interpreted as risk aversion under conditions of uncertainty.
3."Leisure" In this model can also be viewed as time devoted to non—market
or household production. This interpretation renders the assumption of
substitutability between £ and £2 more palatable. Some of the results
below are dependent upon thts assumption ——inparticular those which do
not hold the employment status of member 2 constant become ambiguous in
sign if strong compleinentarities between £,and£2 are permitted. The
empirical evidence on this point is contradtctory, but Ashenfelter and
Heckman conclude that the cross—substitution effect is zero.
4. The state E should be indexed by the wage, butthisis ignored for the
moment to simplify the notation.
5. is thus a function of the arrival rates of job offers and job
separations decribed above.
6. Throughout, it is assumed that member 2 is devoting time to market work at
the wage w2.
7. Proposition I does not depend upon the assumption that £i and £2 are
substitutes, but this additional result does. All proofs are contained in
Chapter 2 of Lundberg.
8. We can expect that the values b will change in some predictable manner
over the life—cycle of household members and the current approach, which
focuses on the short—run dynamics of the labour market, abstracts from
such considerations. To the extent that future events which change the
value of non—market time, such as births or educational opportunities, are
anticipated and planned for, this stochastic model will not provide an
adequate description of household behavior. The same argument, of course,
can be applied to predictable change in available wage rates over the life
cycle, which affect household res2onse to current wages. In what follows,
the distributions f (w )andg(b )areassumed to be exogenous, though
their dependence on acors under 6e long—run control of the household is
here acknowledged.
9. Ideally, we should like to identify the household's decision rules
(wi,wj) themselves, so that the effect of one member's wage on the
other's reservation wage and value of non—participation can be estimated
directly. Unfortunately, the four elements of the household's strategy
are unobservable and observing transitions alone will not permit
identification of the reservation wage function, so a reduced form
estimation of the transition probabilities is necessary.
10. In particular, see Tuma, Hannon, and Goreneveld [1979] for a general
discussion and Flinn and Heckman for empirical comparisons of discrete and
continuous—time methods.
3411. Considerable evidence is accumulating that duration dependence is an
important attribute of the rate of leaving unemployment. See, most
recently, Flinn and Heckman, or, for a treatment explicitly based on non—
stationary search strategies, Kiefer and Neumann [1979].
12. This has been shown by Ueckman and Borjas.
13. In general, the unemployment rates for SIME/DIME female heads were much
higher than for married women in the U.S. population, and participation
rates were somewhat lower, particularly in the arly years of the
experiment.
14. The antilog of the coefficient on a dummyvariablein this model gives the
multiplier effect of the dichotomous variables on the transition rate.
15. To perform a test of the explanatory power of the model, we compare it
with another model where all coefficients except the constant term are
constrained to equal zero. The constant term in this model is the average
transition rate, or the total number of transitions divided by the total
length of time the sample is observed in the initial state. If all
households were identical and durations were controlled by a single—
parameter exponential process, this statistic would be the appropriate
estimator of the exponential parameter.
Implementing the comparison for the model in column 1, the value of
the log of the likelihood function is 38.31 for the constrained version,
as opposed to 368.37 for the unconstrained model. A standard likelihood
raio test gives a test statistic of 660.12, which is distributed
xh(l1).The critical value of the test statistics at a 99 percent
siginificance level is 24.7, so we can reject the null hypothesis that all
coefficients other than the constant term are equal to zero. All models
reported here are able to pass a similar test at a 95 percent level,
enabling us to conclude that they explain the specified transitions better
than a single—parameter exponential process.
16. The puzzling aspect of the E+N transition rate estimates appears when we
turn our attention to the own—wage and tax effects. A negative sign on
the own wage effect was expected, and this expectation is confirmed for
the male head unemployed subsample (Column 3). When the male is employed,
however, the own—wage effect is positive and accompanied by large,
negative tax effects. The possibility that these results are due to non—
linearities in the wage effect, since the tax variables are so highly
correlated with the wage when employed, points up the need for future
experimentation with various functional forms in the specification of
these transition rates. At present, it must simply be noted that
misspecification may be a serious problem.
17. Other income and hourly taxes are allowed to vary by employment state, due
to the state dependence of transfer payments and the non—linearity of
income taxes.
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37APPENDIX A
TableA—I
Spell Sample Means of Variables By Employment
State of Female Head*
Denver
Outof
Employed Unemployed Labour Force
1 =Malehead employed 0.78 0.76 0.70
1 =Black 0.32 0.43 0.23
I =Mexican—American 0.27 0.26 0.39
Age in years —femalehead 29.5 28.9 29.0
Years of schooling —femalehead 11.4 11.2 10.8
Hourly wage —femalehead ($) 2.02
Predicted wage —femalehead ($) 1.83 1.70
Actual or predicted hourly wage —
malehead ($) 3.26 3.30 3.29
Other income ($/tuo.) 83.44 111.76 116.99
Net assets Cs) 3,730 3,084 3,101
Hourly tax on earnings of
female head
—DIME 0.10 0.14 0.14
—othertaxes and transfers 0.44 0.75 0.69
Number of children < 6 0.92 0.99 1.11
< 16 2.01 1.94 2.16
Number of Observations 2553 765 3548
*(Alldollar quantities in July 1972 dollars)
38Table A—2
Spell Sample Means of Variables By Employment
State of Female Head*
Seattle
Outof
Employed Unemployed Labour Force
I =Malehead employed 0.70 0.65 0.62
I =Black 0.44 0.49 0.34
Age in years —femalehead 32.0 31.2 31.4
Years of schooling —femalehead 11.4 10.9 11.2
Hourly wage —femalehead Cs) 2.46
Predicted wage —femalehead ($) ——— 2.11 1.89
Actual or predicted hourly wage —
malehead (5) 3.86 3.70 3.97
Other income ($/mo.) 71.83 114.42 97.55
Net assets ($) 5,120 4,395 4,376
Hourly tax on earnings of
female head
—SINE 0.16 0.09 0.11
—othertaxes and transfers 0.40 0.79 0.65
Number of children < 6 0.72 0.74 0.96
< 16 1.89 1.87 2.06
Number of Observations 1742 752 2432
*(Alldollar quantities in July 1972 dollars)
39Table A—3
Characteristics of the Household Sample
Denver Seattle
Financial control, no SIME/DIME
payment (%) 43.4 48.1
Remained in sample for entire 4 years (%) 68.5 80.1
Black (%) 28.4 38.8
Mexican—American (%) 34,5
White (%) 37.1 61.2
Years of schooling completed (7.)
12 or less —malehead 84.3 79.2
12 or less —femalehead 90.0 82.7
10 or less —malehead 33.8 34.5
10 or less —femalehead 38.3 25.8
Mean Ageinyears —January1, 1972
—malehead 33.4 36.9
—femalehead 30.6 33.0
Mean predicted wages —1972
—malehead 3.34 3.86
—femalehead 1.86 2.02
Number of households 1389 993
40